Trade policy in the European Union and the United States is to a large extent delegated to executive agents. Existing explanations claim that legislators delegate because they wish to liberalize but are unable to achieve this on their own. We show that legislators delegate powers to obtain foreign market access for exporters and protection for import-competing interests. Confronted with heterogeneous demands from both groups, principals delegate to two sets of agents to confer concentrated benefits on these constituencies, and install control to avoid concentrated losses, while maintaining the flow of resources from lobbying. We derive the empirically observable implication that, with the increase in the share of tradables in the overall economy, delegation as well as control should have steadily increased over time, and then test the validity of this proposition for US trade policy since 1916 and for European trade policy since 1958.
Introduction
Students of European trade policy have often wondered whether this policy field is characterized by its gradual supra-nationalization or rather by its re-nationalization. 1 Throughout the 1990s, the question of trade competences was framed in terms of why the member states of the European Union (EU) "sought to regain some of their lost sovereignty in the realm of trade" (Nicolaïdis & Meunier, 2002) . Debate on American trade policy similarly has often centered on the riddle whether the United States (US) Congress has abdicated its constitutional powers of trade policy in favor of the President, or whether it still dominates the policy process. Important analysts have claimed that, after having abdicated trade policy responsibility for several decades, Congress reclaimed control of this policy field starting in the 1970s and even more so in the 1980s (Destler, 1992; O'Halloran, 1994) . With regard to trade policy-making in both Europe and the US, therefore, the scholarly debate has concentrated on how principals' control over trade policy agents has changed over time. In this article, we take issue with this prevalent view, and provide one single explanation for why principals have consistently delegated ever more trade policy powers for market access as well as protection, and have simultaneously kept close control over trade policy in both political systems.
We develop our explanation by drawing on the language provided by the principalagent literature. At the same time, we cast doubt on the analytical usefulness of an assumption underlying most of the existing accounts of delegation in the trade policy field, namely that differences in policy preferences for liberalization or protection between constituencies, principals, and agents have led to wide-spread conflict over delegation and control. Some authors regard the agent as more liberal in orientation than principals and their domestic constituencies (Pastor, 1980; Goldstein, 1993; Elsig, 2002; Nicolaïdis & Meunier, 2002) , whereas others offer reasons that it might be in the bureaucratic self-interest of an agent to be more protectionist than its principals (Frey and Buhofer, 1986) . Still others assume that both principals and agents have more liberal preferences than their constituencies (Bauer, Pool & Dexter, 1964; Destler, 1992; O'Halloran, 1994) . The idea that differing preferences produce problems in the principal-agent relationship has led many authors to look for periods of principals' abdication and their reassertion of power, and for the pervasiveness of conflict over trade authority, instead of focusing on why delegation and concurrent control, despite occasional conflict, have come to be the institutional set-up of choice in different political settings.
In our view, constituencies formulate demands to politicians which these seek to satisfy -since they depend on constituencies' resources for their re-election -by conveying concentrated benefits on them.
2 Over the course of time, these constituency demands have increasingly become heterogeneous, i.e. have come from a mix of exporters and importcompeting industries, instead of from a clear constituency in favor of either more protection or freer trade. To overcome the transaction costs of dealing with this heterogeneity, principals have delegated to specialized agents. After this initial delegation, the scope of delegation increased because the share of tradables as a percentage of the whole economy increased over time. Principals, however, have not abdicated their trade policy powers, but have always adjusted the degree of control to the increasing scope of delegation. If this theoretical account proves correct, no periods of abdication and reassertion but rather a steady increase of both the scope of delegation and control should be empirically observable.
We thus seek to transcend the single case approach to trade policy so prevalent in the literature, apparent both in the sui generis accounts of European trade governance and in the American literature, which tends to be centered exclusively on the US political system. If changes in trade flows are the driving factor and have developed in about the same way in both the US and Europe, there should also be important institutional parallels in the sequence of delegation and control in both cases. By drawing out the main similarities of both political systems, we seek to reduce idiosyncratic explanations of their institutional arrangements, and relate public authorities and institutions to their governance relationship with private actors. In the following, we first develop this argument; we then apply it in a study of American trade policies over the past century and of European trade policies since the inception of the European Communities.
The Argument: Which Scope of Delegation and Why Control?
We structure our theoretical discussion around two major questions. First, why do principals delegate their trade policy powers to agents, and what determines the scope of delegation to the agent? And second, why do they want to keep tight control over these agents? We thus provide a rationale for why agent discretion should not have changed over time.
Heterogeneity, Transaction Costs, and the Institutional Form of Delegation
We propose that in the trade policy field, delegation is the principals' response to an increase in the heterogeneity of constituency interests. A key characteristic of trade policies is that they confer concentrated costs and benefits on organized groups, while conveying diffuse costs and benefits upon all other sections of society (Frieden & Rogowski, 1996) . We should therefore expect political actors to primarily seek to satisfy the demands of exporters and importcompeting industries, upon which they seek to bestow concentrated benefits in exchange for resources such as information and possibly, but not necessarily, financial contributions, both of which can be essential to maintain office. Political actors, whether principals or agents, do not have a specific trade policy preference independent of constituency demands. They rather act as office-seekers, avoiding the mobilization of political enemies. Voters experience only diffuse benefits or suffer diffuse costs from trade policies, and they are not capable of organizing effectively on the trade issue (Olson, 1965 Legislators can easily achieve this objective by way of direct legislation as long as organized constituency interests are homogeneous. When facing a constituency that depends mainly on exports, they legislate for freer trade policies, and when facing a predominantly import-competing constituency, they vote for protectionist policies. In such a setting, parliaments are the only relevant actors determining trade policy. This was arguably the situation as it prevailed in the US and in Europe throughout most of the nineteenth century.
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, in developed countries constituency preferences on trade have increasingly become heterogeneous (Hall, 1998; Hiscox 1999) .
As a result, many legislators are confronted with lobbying from both exporting and import-competing interests. Facing the dilemma of having to represent the two interests at the same time, they have to engineer policies that are able to deliver both for interests favoring foreign market access and those advocating sustained or increased protection. (Shaffer 2003) .
To serve import-competing interests, principals have mandated the US International
Trade Commission and the Anti-Dumping Unit of the European Commission to establish whether dumping has taken place, make injury examinations, and impose antidumping duties (Finger, Hall & Nelson, 1982; Schuknecht, 1992 Keohane & Yoffie, 1987) . US Congress created the special position of Chief US Textile Negotiator inside the USTR to negotiate the trade restricting multi-fiber arrangement.
Our account thus addresses remaining inconsistencies in existing explanations and offers one single explanation for why principals choose delegation both for liberalization and protection. Existing accounts have often concentrated on international trade negotiations intended to achieve reciprocal reductions of trade barriers, at the exclusion of delegation for protectionist purposes. One widely held view has come to be that at a particular point in time principals realized that lower domestic tariffs would lead to economically more efficient outcomes. Recognizing that such lower tariffs would not be politically possible as long as the principals themselves made trade policy, they allegedly decided to protect themselves from protectionist pressures by delegating to an agent (Bauer, Pool & Dexter, 1964; Haggard 1988; Goldstein 1993; Lohmann & O'Halloran, 1994; O'Halloran, 1994) . This thesis was developed mainly in the American trade policy literature, in which context Destler (1992) coined the phrase that delegation provided "protection for Congress" from protectionist pressures.
Having aggravated the effects of the Great Depression, the infamously protectionist SmootHawley tariff of 1930 allegedly had taught Congress that a universalistic logroll among protectionist members led to sub-optimal outcomes (Goldstein, 1993) . Congress then "learned" it was institutionally unable to deliver an economically efficient trade policy advantageous to all, and abdicated its constitutional powers to its agent, the executive. In this delegation-for-liberalization view, legislators reacted to mounting protectionist pressures by delegating powers to provide protection to administrative agencies, purposefully deflecting these pressures away from the legislature. Nicolaïdis and Meunier (2002) adopt this view and posit that by establishing the Treaty of Rome in 1958 the European Community (EC) member states delegated trade policy powers to insulate the policy-making process from domestic pressures. These explanations either implicitly or explicitly adopt the "blame-shifting" argument that is prominent in the general principal-agent literature in which legislators would delegate in order to conceal their contribution to an unpopular policy (Arnold, 1990) .
However common in the literature, this explanation is unsatisfactory and misleading for several reasons. First, it seems implausible that legislators can fool their import-competing constituents repeatedly, since these can be expected to learn from policies that do not serve them well. The possibility to put blame on an agent therefore appears to be a convenient side effect of, rather than a motivation for delegation. Second, if parliamentarians were indeed to delegate for reasons of economic efficiency (O'Halloran, 1994) , each of them should be tempted to try and obtain protection for her own constituency, while leaving colleagues to vote for the delegation of liberalization powers. The temptation not to contribute, yet to reap the benefits from this far-sighted and trade-enhancing policy should make it difficult for principals to overcome their collective action problems. Third, why would import-competing interests acquiesce with an institutional arrangement that would obviously put them at a disadvantage? The RTAA actually led to an increase rather than a reduction in importcompeting lobbying (Hiscox, 1999) , making the argument about politicians' insulation implausible. These inconsistencies in existing accounts of delegation reduce their power to explain why legislators so consistently choose to delegate trade policy.
Over time, and after taking the initial step of delegating, principals have increased the scope of delegation, i.e. have expanded the agent's authority to cover more sectors of the economy. The expansion of imports and exports which taken together make up the tradables sector in a domestic economy have spurred new demands coming from sections of society hitherto unaffected by increasing trade. This has led ever more firms to become exporters or import-competitors. Formerly, exporters were mainly interested in tariff reductions in foreign countries. Since then new exporters have demanded better foreign market access conditions in the field of services, intellectual property, investment, competition, and government procurement policies. 5 Politicians have reacted to these new exporter demands by increasing the scope of the delegation, and they have endowed negotiating agents under the US President and within the European Commission with new trade competences in a steady manner.
Moreover, as trade flows have intensified, more sectors have felt the strains of increased imports, and have demanded policies to protect their interests. As a result, the principals have acted to satisfy these heterogeneous demands increasing the scope of delegation to open foreign markets and provide relief for import-competing interests.
Principals' Mechanisms of Agent Control
So far, we have concentrated our discussion on why politicians might choose delegation, and what might determine their chosen scope of delegation. Analytically distinct, but of course intricately linked to this are the questions of why and how principals exert control over their agents and of how control relates to specific degrees of delegation. We can distinguish ex ante and ex post controls (Epstein & O'Halloran, 1999; Pollack, 2003) . First, ex ante controls are the provisions that define the legal instruments available to an agent and the procedures it must follow. Important are the time restraints that principals impose upon the agents:
delegation can be permanent, as with the creation of administrative units to conduct antidumping or market access investigations, or they can be temporary, i.e. be limited in time, as with negotiation mandates. With permanent delegation, principals create multiple agents and go to great lengths to specify the agents' procedures in detail, so as to determine as narrowly as possible the main constituency that is to influence the agent. The lower the majority requirement on this issue, the more credible is the threat to sanction the agent. The transaction costs linked to such control are relatively low since each legislator can rely on harmed constituencies voicing their interests in the event an agent imposes concentrated costs on them.Sanctioning, however, should rarely be observed since an agent can foresee the possibility of being sanctioned and thus submits ex ante to the preferences of the principals.
Second, principals do not grant large discretion or autonomy to an agent since they want to maintain the flow of resources from lobbying. As long as politicians are seeking office, they are dependent on resources, which lobbying provides them with in the form of information, political support, and possibly financial contributions. If politicians delegated the authority to act on trade to an agent without exercising control, the lobbying activities of constituency groups would increasingly be directed to the agent set up to service the constituency, something the principals would want to avoid. In sum, by controlling the agent, and thus signaling that they can still influence policy decisions, principals can make sure that they remain the target of the lobbying of both exporting and import-competing interests, and that no group within society has to bear concentrated costs from the agents' policies agents.
While we argue that principals exert control over trade policy agents, we do not go so far as to say that their control is watertight. A certain discretion is in-built in any principalagent relationship (Pollack, 2003) . Rather than attribute bureaucratic shirking to differing policy preferences, we question the premise underlying this concept, namely that principals (or agents) have a specific policy preference of their own concerning free trade or protectionism. If our intuition is correct, and principals and agents mainly try to satisfy diverging interest group demands, the agents' incentives for shirking become negligible. Our argument for control also stands in contradiction to the view of Lohmann and O'Halloran (1994) , who argued that, in the absence of divided government, principals would delegate all trade policy power to the agent, given that the agent imposes efficient policies. They thereby imply that principals do not have an incentive to exert control over their agent under unified government. In our analysis, even if the preferences of principals and agents coincide, control is maintained because of the benefits it conveys on the principals. 
Delegation of Trade Policy Powers in the US and the EC/EU
After having provided a theoretical rationale for why no periods of principals' abdication and reassertion on trade policy should be observable, we now present empirical evidence showing how our reasoning can account for the course of delegation and control in European and American trade policy. We discuss various instances of trade policymaking in the EU and the US that show how principals have systematically delegated new tasks while extending control mechanisms over their agents. We mainly concentrate on international negotiations, market access investigations, and anti-dumping procedures, while merely touching on other trade remedies such as countervailing duties and safeguards. By pointing out delegation and control features in three different historical epochs, we derive conclusions on the balance of delegation and control over time.
In particular, we demonstrate that after the initial delegation of trade authority in the first epoch studied, although the scope of trade authority increased over time (see tables 1 and 2), this neither led to principals' abdication in the second epoch, nor to their reassertion in the third epoch.
TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE

Creating and Controlling Trade Policy Agents
The Origins of Delegation in US Trade Policy
Although the American constitution confers the powers to set tariffs and to regulate foreign commerce on Congress, American legislators delegated trade authority to the executive as early as 1890 (O'Halloran, 1994) . Congress indeed delegated substantial tariff bargaining authority and the possibility to change the tariff-free treatment of particular items by proclamation to the President, a delegation of powers that was declared constitutional by a Supreme Court decision in 1892. Two decades later, in 1916, Congress set up a permanent agent, the Tariff Commission, with a very narrow mandate, namely of providing "objective" economic information, which Congress could rely on in its task of tariff setting. While the delegation to the Tariff Commission was intended to serve export interests (Schnietz, 1996) , the nearly simultaneous passage of the Anti-dumping Act (1916), which delegated the authority to impose anti-dumping duties against products imported at a price lower than the producer's sales price in the country of origin, satisfied import-competing interests. Only shortly after, in 1922, Congress added a temporary delegation of proclamatory power that allowed the President to increase or decrease tariffs by up to 50 percent. The President, however, could only act upon recommendation from the Tariff Commission. Early on, therefore, delegation in American trade policy followed the principles set out above:
delegation to several agents, for both exporting and import-competing interests, and control to ensure that constituency interests are protected.
Nevertheless, until the highly protectionist Smoot-Hawley Act (1930) the principals continued to satisfy at least some of the constituency interests by way of direct legislation.
Only in 1934, Congress decided to delegate trade-negotiating authority to the President in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA), a move that favored American exporting interests. The RTAA included a provision that removed the necessity that trade agreements be ratified by a two-thirds majority in the Senate, a requirement that applies to ordinary international treaties concluded by the US administration. Although this might suggest congressional abdication from trade policy making, this impression is refuted by the fact that the RTAA also included strong control features. Delegation was limited to three years, and, at the end of this period, Congress had to act again to renew the delegation. This introduced a potent oversight control mechanism that ensured that the negotiating agent, in making concessions, would minimize concentrated costs on import-competing groups, and that constituency interests would continue their lobbying of principals. Moreover, the RTAA included ex ante controls such as a provision that set out that the executive had to hold hearings before engaging in trade negotiations, and strict limits to agent autonomy through provisions that set out the conditions under which the agent could use its authority. The existence of these various control features is the most important counter-argument to the view that US legislators used the RTAA to isolate themselves from organized interests (Bauer, Pool & Dexter, 1964; Destler, 1992) .
Delegation of Trade Authority in the Early European Communities
In the early European Communities, delegation and control displayed features similar to the US case consisting of a combination of separate institutional channels within the European Commission through which it served the interests of exporters and import-competing industries. In the Treaty of Rome, the six founding member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) delegated powers to negotiate on foreign market access and import restrictions, and also entrusted the European Commission with permanent powers to raise duties in the event of dumping or foreign subsidization. Representatives, the Commercial Questions Group, the Special Committee on Agriculture, specialized sectoral committees, and most importantly, the Article 113 Committee . Member states' representatives controlled their negotiating agent through their presence in negotiations. 9 Principals ensured they could sanction their agent through the rejection of Commission proposals by a veto minority in the General Affairs Council, composed of members' foreign ministers, and that only after an initial transition period of eight years during which decisions would be taken unanimously.
Apart from these temporary negotiation powers, EC member states also delegated permanent powers to a specialized agent within the Commission to service import-competing interests, a fact that stands in contradiction to the view that member states delegated in order to achieve liberalization. They transferred powers from their national executives to the European level to conduct anti-dumping investigations, giving the Commission autonomy to process complaints from European industry that alleged dumping on the part of foreign producers. In 1968, the year the common customs tariff was completed, EC member states formalized these powers in an act of delegation, stipulating that the Commission decides on the imposition of temporary anti-dumping duties and the termination of proceedings (Holmes & Kepton, 1996; Schuknecht, 1992) . 10 They subjected their anti-dumping agent to oversight control by requiring that she report to a number of lower-level specialized committees in the Council and the Anti-Dumping Committee, and by making a decision on the imposition of definitive duties by the Commission subject to a qualified majority in the Council. 11 Finally, member states serviced their import-competing agricultural constituencies by delegating trade aspects of their common agricultural policy, not to the European Commission's directorategeneral for external relations competent for trade in industrial goods, but to a separate agent, the directorate-general for agriculture, which they made report to agriculture ministers, rather than to foreign ministers.
Abdicating Trade Authority to the Agent?
Accounts of delegation and control in American and European trade policy often suggest that after the initial decision to delegate, the principals abdicated trade policy authority to agents (Destler, 1992) . In this section, we cast some doubt on this view, and instead show that control has kept pace with the increasing scope of delegation. which Congress delegated authority to the President to make 50 percent linear cuts of tariff rates, and substantially softened the peril-point provision (Zeiler, 1992 Congress to increase its control over the negotiating agent by making sure that it would deal with a weaker agent. In particular, having a separate agent for trade negotiations had the advantage of limiting the agent's ability to make issue-linkages between foreign and trade policy. The TEA also provides some evidence for the principle that trade negotiation authority is delegated for import-competing and exporting interests at the same time. Congress especially pushed the executive to negotiate an international agreement to restrict textile imports (Zeiler, 1992) .
Delegation and Control in the Post-war US
The STR used the negotiation powers granted in the TEA to gain market access for American exporters during the ensuing Kennedy Round (1964 Round ( -1967 Commission to view American antidumping law as having precedence over a code that the STR had negotiated against the wishes of the principals during the Kennedy Round. Valuation Code, it also sought to limit the negative impact of the American Selling Price mechanism -a protectionist method of valuating chemical imports to the US (Winham, 1986) .
Extending Delegation and Control in the EC
Increased imports during the world steel depression prompted member states to delegate further trade policy powers. They granted the Commission the competence it had previously not had under the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), to negotiate voluntary export restraints for steel products with non-EC countries (Messerlin, 1987) . 12 Principals had the Commission negotiate similar safeguards on behalf of other import-competing industries such as semiconductors, automobiles, and consumer electronics (Schuknecht 1992) . In 1984, they also increased control over their anti-dumping agent by giving European import-competing industries the possibility to appeal Commission decisions before the European Court of Justice (Jackson & Vermulst, 1989) and made the Commission report yearly on its anti-dumping and anti-subsidy activities.
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In the same year, member states introduced injury rules in the EC anti-dumping regulation to make sure the Commission did not go too far in satisfying import-competing interests while imposing concentrated costs on industrial consumers of these imports (Schuknecht, 1992 ). 14 Also in 1984, principals attempted to service exporter constituencies by delegating powers to the European Commission to conduct market access investigations, the scope of which they defined in the regulation on the so-called New Commercial Policy
Instrument (Bronckers, 1996; . The pattern of delegation and control thus confirms that EC member states steadily increased the scope of delegation while extending their mechanisms of control.
3.3
Reassertion and Re-nationalization, or further Delegation?
Delegation with a US Congress on Guard
From the 1970s onwards, existing accounts have seen a reassertion of congressional control over trade policy agents in American trade policy (Nicolaïdis, 1999, p.99) . In this section, we
show that what can be observed is rather a continuation of the developments in the previous period. Again, the growing share of tradables in the US economy made the principals decide upon an increase in the scope of delegation. Most importantly, Congress conferred powers to engage in negotiations concerning non-tariff barriers (NTBs) upon the STR. While thus extending the scope of delegation, Congress insisted on maintaining control that was to be secured by requiring congressional approval of all agreements concerning NTBs, a procedure known as "fast track" because it specifies time limits within which Congress has to act (Pastor, 1980) . Moreover, Congress created an Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations, representing all sectors of the economy plus labor and consumers, to secure improved oversight control. The Committee was instructed to report to Congress at the conclusion of trade negotiations on the compatibility of an agreement reached with its members' economic interests. The Trade Act of 1974, therefore, at the same time augmented the scope of delegation and strengthened congressional oversight of the trade negotiators, making sure that the relative autonomy of the agent remained unchanged.
Section 301 of this trade legislation also mandated the STR to initiate investigations into foreign market restrictions, and, if unfair foreign barriers were found, to retaliate. This offensive trade instrument allowed the STR to act upon exporters' demands for better foreign market access. To satisfy import-competing interests, principals made the countervailing duties instrument more accessible to import-competing industries, by legislating that action on a case had to be taken within a year of receipt of a petition, and that all cases in which relief had been denied had to undergo judicial review (Destler, 1992, pp. 144-145) . Congress even made the imposition of countervailing duties mandatory in cases in which imports were proven to be subsidized. The only remaining discretion left to the executive was that the Treasury Department could waive the countervailing duties for four years if there was a prospect of finding an agreement with a foreign country. Furthermore, the escape clause was changed so as to ensure that even the threat of injury could be given as a reason for relief from foreign competition. Finally, the negotiations of limits on foreign subsidies in the Tokyo
Round provided protection to import-competing interests.
In rights (Hudec, 1999, p. 158) . At the same time, by moving the authority of starting investigations in Section 301 cases from the President to the USTR, principals limited the executive's discretion concerning when to use these instruments. Again, therefore, delegation and control increased at the same pace.
The increasing share of tradables in the economy led to an extension of the scope of trade policy in the Uruguay Round (1986 Round ( -1994 to include such new issues as trade in services and intellectual property rights, accompanied by an increase in congressional control. 15 The hitherto largely domestic services sectors, such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications pushed for the liberalization of services (Drake & Nicolaïdis, 1992) , whereas mainly the pharmaceutical industry aggressively lobbied for a framework agreement that would oblige all GATT members to introduce domestic laws for the protection of 
New competences for the EU
The rise in the share of tradables in the EC economy in the first half of the 1980s, especially in the formerly non-tradables sectors of services, resulted in new constituency demands. EC member states responded by increasing the scope of delegation and granting the European
Commission with an informal negotiating mandate to conduct the Uruguay Round negotiations in wholly new areas of trade policy, such as trade in services, intellectual property protection, health standards, and investment, while monitoring the negotiations directly (Paemen & Bensch, 1995; Hoekman & Kostecki, 2001 ).
Inter-institutional conflict over the scope and institutional structure of delegation in regard to these new competences has led commentators to conclude that throughout the 1990s member states were busy trying to claw back trade competences from the Commission (Nicolaïdis & Meunier, 2002) . Member states, however, did not take back any of the competences they had previously delegated, but rather increased the scope of delegation and extended their control mechanisms. They accompanied the increase in the scope of delegation for new trade policy areas with an increase in control by insisting on the legal formula of mixed agreements, as confirmed by opinion 1/94 from the European Court of Justice (Bourgeois, 1995) . Member states ensured that the negotiating agent remained constrained by threatening with national vetoes in the areas of trade in services or the international regulation of intellectual property protection, just as they had always done in the area of trade in goods.
Inter-institutional legal controversy over the question of exclusive or shared competencies arose when the European Commission insisted on a clear mandate to exercise its functions, leading to conflict about an appropriate institutional arrangement, rather than about policy choices. In practice, the member states and the Commission had been on the same line throughout the Uruguay Round and beyond (Paemen & Bensch, 1995; Young, 2002, p. 42) .
The "new" issues, such as audiovisual services, were thus treated no differently from the traditional areas of industrial goods or agriculture. Illustrative of this continuity is the fact that, on behalf of French wheat growers, the newly elected conservative French government put political blame on the negotiating agent for allegedly having transgressed its mandate at the Blair House agreement with the US on agriculture trade. In substance, however, the renegotiations demanded by France only led to symbolic changes (Nicolaïdis & Meunier, 2002 ).
In the middle of the liberalization negotiations of the Uruguay Round, EC member states stepped up delegation to their anti-dumping agent to secure political support from import-competing sectors. In 1988, they introduced an additional duty for cases in which the foreign exporter accused of dumping does not increase the price on the EC market, that is in which he tries to bear the price of the antidumping duty himself. 16 In 1994, they lowered the approval threshold for definitive anti-dumping measures to a simple majority in the Council (Woolcock, 2000) . 17 On the control side, they kept the anti-dumping agent from imposing too high costs on other groups in society by specifying for the first time that not only complaining industries but also consumers and processing industry should be heard during anti-dumping investigations. They also transferred the appeals procedure available to the complaining industry from the European Court of Justice to the Court of First Instance, expecting that the latter would not limit itself to procedure, but would also rule on matters of substance, like calculations (Holmes & Kepton, 1996) . Regulation Unit and the Market Access Unit were to process exporting industries' complaints on market access problems, whether in trade in goods, in services, or in the application of intellectual property rules, and, if necessary, they were to process them into a dispute settlement case in the WTO (Shaffer, 2003) . 18 By giving exporters the possibility to ask for judicial review at the European Court of Justice, while installing the ex post sanction that
Commission proposals would only be overturned if a qualified majority of member states was against it, principals ensured the Commission would carry out its task according to the detailed rules set out in the act of delegation. 
Conclusion
The delegation of trade authority is an important feature of both American and European trade policy. We have provided an explanation for the pervasiveness of delegation in contemporary trade policy that starts from the assumption that neither principals nor agents have a clear preference for trade-enhancing and economically efficient policies. For several decades, legislators have been confronted with heterogeneous demands that come from importcompeting groups seeking protection on the one hand, and from exporters demanding access to foreign markets on the other hand. As legislators are uncertain which constituency will be most important for their political future, they aim at satisfying the demands of both groups in order to forestall the emergence of organized opposition to their policies. The best way of doing so is by delegating trade authority to two sets of agents, one of which is mandated to service import-competing interests, and the other to satisfy the demands of exporters of goods and services. In contrast to existing arguments, this explanation can account for the fact that delegation systematically takes place both for protectionist and for liberalizing political ends, and not just for the latter. At the same time, legislators maintain control over their agents to ensure that delegation does not impose concentrated losses on any part of society, and that interest groups maintain their lobbying activities at the level of the principals. From this argument, we derive the empirical implication that principals accompany an extension in the scope of delegation by parallel increases in the degree of control; put differently, the degree of control keeps pace with the scope of delegation. We have found support for our hypothesis in an empirical study of delegation and control in American and European trade policy.
Whereas the aim of this article has been to show the plausibility of a novel argument for delegation in the trade policy field, future research could engage in a more rigorous test of the argument against some alternative explanations. First, differences in party preferences over trade liberalization versus protectionism may have an influence on principals' decision to delegate trade authority (Schnietz, 2000) . Yet, in Europe throughout the period treated here and in the US at least for several decades, parties have hardly disagreed over trade policy issues (Hiscox, forthcoming 2005) . This provides some first support for our hunch that the delegation of trade authority requires an explanation different from party politics. Second, the causes for the extension of delegation in both trading entities could be squarely situated with the impact of international trade negotiations. These are essentially exchanges of market access concessions, during which each member is confronted with demands coming from the other negotiating party, and not originating with domestic constituency demands. In the US, however, the passage of trade legislation mandating an agent to engage in trade negotiations normally precedes the start of international trade negotiations, suggesting limitations to this counter-argument. Finally, executive leadership by the US President and the European Commission could have produced an increase in the scope of delegation (Haggard, 1988; Elsig, 2002) . However, the American President, who has an electoral base, is subject to the same diverging demands from import-competing and export-oriented constituencies as his counterparts in parliament. In Europe, the European Commission lacks the direct electoral legitimation, necessary to engage in executive leadership. Nevertheless, the jury is still out on which of these competing theoretical arguments performs best empirically.
